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Abstract 
In order to analyze short-term persistence in Norwegian equity mutual fund returns, two 
methods are applied. The backbone for both of them is a sorting procedure that creates four 
equally weighted portfolios based on lagged one-year returns. These ranked portfolios are 
subject to three different holding strategies, i.e. they are rebalanced every one, six and twelve 
months. The first method uses the 4-factor model by Carhart to obtain risk-adjusted returns 
from all the portfolios. The second one analyzes rank dependency by utilizing contingency 
tables. The results are somewhat mixed. None of the ranked portfolios were able to create 
significant risk-adjusted alphas, but simple returns seem to be affected by rankings and the 
holding periods. Consistency in rankings is present when the portfolios are rebalanced every 
one and six months. Finally, persistent behavior is gradually diminishing as the post-
formation period increases. 
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1 Introduction 
Financial markets around the world have experienced periods of severe turmoil during the 
past century, where the recent financial crisis of 2008 serves as the biggest negative shock 
since the Great Depression. Massive corrections took place in several markets after this event, 
especially in developed economies like the U.S. and the Eurozone. This has unquestionably 
increased the focus on the returns of equity assets such as mutual funds and their underlying 
stocks. In these periods of high volatility, uncertainty tends to affect the risk appetite of 
private and institutional investors. Some will naturally shift their exposure to less risky assets 
to get safer returns on their capital. However, as markets plummet, key policy rates tend to go 
down as governments try to stimulate economies during recessions. This will from time to 
time create a negative real rate of return on traditional low risk investments, making well-
diversified mutual funds look like more profitable investments over time.  
It seems to be a growing consensus around the globe that mutual funds, on average, create 
higher returns than for instance a standard savings account. That is if the investment horizon 
is relatively long. This has unsurprisingly become one of the industry’s favorite arguments 
when campaigning for their products, i.e. mutual funds. Such marketing strategies have been 
criticized heavily by the academic world. The notion that you can get higher expected returns 
“for free” by changing exposure to other assets is not supported by financial theory where free 
lunches in general does not exist. As economists have pointed out for decades, consistent high 
returns compared to some benchmark must be a product of higher risk. In practice, investors 
choose to take on more risk in order to get the increased expected return in the form of a risk 
premium. This gives major implications against using gross returns as an argument for 
performance. High returns could simply be the case of high risk. Academics have therefore 
found ways to create risk-adjusted returns so that an asset would need to create higher returns 
relative to the risk it bears in order to receive any credit. A variety of research papers have 
analyzed the mutual fund industry’s ability to create risk-adjusted returns over the years, e.g. 
Jensen (1968) and the more recent Fama and French (2010). The conclusions have mostly 
been devastating for the fund managers. Very few funds seem to be able to create better 
returns than the underlying theory would predict. This has by no means stopped the industry 
from using gross returns as their parameter of choice when introducing funds to the public.  
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Figure 1: Index values and monthly returns of the Oslo Børs Mutual Fund Index 
 
This type of marketing presents another problem, which will be the main topic of this thesis. 
The intuitively appealing thought that high previous returns will lead to high future returns is 
at best questionable in the light of financial theory. Nevertheless, past returns are often used in 
practice as an indicator of expected returns. These types of momentum strategies center their 
trading profiles on persistence in mutual fund returns. Much research has been done on this 
matter for the U.S. market, e.g. Malikel (1995) and Carhart (1997), but the results are slightly 
mixed. However, the general opinion is that most funds do not exhibit persistent behavior, at 
least in a risk-adjusted world. The latest paper describing persistence in Norwegian mutual 
funds is Sørensen (2009). He found no sign of significant persistence in returns, but his 
analysis on this matter covers only one operational method, and it represents a minor part of 
the overall paper. 
The problem addressed by this thesis is to what extent Norwegian equity mutual funds display 
persistent behavior in returns. The analysis wants to enlighten this problem by using a 
methodology similar to the one applied by Carhart (1997), but it will implement it in a 
somewhat different manner. 
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It all begins with defining three different trading strategies that will work as a foundation in 
the analysis. Funds are first ranked according to their lagged one-year returns and put into 
four portfolios based on these rankings. Then, all portfolios are reformed every one, six and 
twelve months, which works as three holding strategies. The purpose of this is to look at how 
portfolio returns change as the post-formation period increases. These returns are finally 
regressed against the 4-factor model of Carhart (1997) to obtain risk-adjusted returns. If one 
of the top or bottom portfolios in fact exhibit abnormal returns, then it would question the 
efficiency of the respective market as it introduces a trading pattern that can easily be 
implemented in real life. 
As a second act, consistency in rankings is analyzed. Contingency tables, similar to the one by 
Carhart (1997), are constructed for each holding strategy. These represent the historical 
probabilities of ending in one ranking given an initial ranking. The advantage of such an 
approach is that patterns of persistent behavior are much more visible than before. Three 
charts display these properties over the different holding periods. This method says nothing 
about how big the underlying returns are, but it gives a picture of how previous returns have 
affected future returns relative to the other ranked portfolios. 
The analysis finds no sign of persistent risk-adjusted returns across the portfolios. This means 
that none of the holding strategies are able to create significant abnormal returns during the 
sample period. This indicates no real threat towards the market efficiency of the Norwegian 
equity fund market. As to rank dependency, substantial differences are observed between the 
three strategies. Persistent behavior in rankings is strong when the holding period is one 
month, while it diminishes considerably as the period is set to six months. The pattern of 
persistence is for all practical purposes wiped out when the twelve month holding period is 
applied. 
A summary of relevant theory and research marks the beginning of this thesis in the second 
section. This is followed by the methodology used in the analysis. A full data description will 
then explain all relevant parameters and present the descriptive statistics of interest. The 
ending includes final results and concluding remarks. 
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2 Historical Background 
Short-term persistence is the subject of interest in this thesis, but in order to create a picture of 
this, a measure of performance is needed. The first subsection will therefore present the 
evolution of some performance methods, while the second introduces the historical findings 
on persistence. The third and final part will work through the efficient market hypothesis and 
relate it to persistence in asset returns. 
2.1 Measuring Performance 
The literature on this subject is extensive and it is outside the scope of this thesis to cover it 
all. The focus will be on the factor models of Jensen (1968), Fama and French (1993) and 
Carhart (1997). Ratio measures have also been widely used in mutual fund performance 
research. Sharpe ratio, Treynor ratio, Information ratio and M
2
 are perhaps the most common 
of them. Their popularity may be a product of their intuitive nature and the fact that they are 
quite easy to construct. The different ratios are all risk-adjusted measures. They do however 
implement this in different ways.  
The chase for good performance measures is an ongoing process. More complex procedures 
are constantly being brought to the table. Dynamic benchmarking is one of those. State 
dependent variables, in addition to the regular passive factors (RMRF, SMB etc.) can be used 
to measure the performance of a mutual fund. The time varying variables could reflect macro 
factors like interest rate spreads or credit rating spreads. 
2.1.1 CAPM and Jensen’s α 
It is natural to start with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) credited to Sharpe (1964) 
and Lintner (1965), which serves as a building block for the other performance models. 
According to Cochrane (2005) it is the first, most famous and the most widely used model in 
asset pricing. It was very successful for a long time and it fitted empirical data well, so its 
popularity is no mystery. The key principle of this equilibrium model is that an asset’s return 
depends solely on the risk-free rate and its correlation with the market portfolio. Thus, the 
only source of risk is its exposure towards the market. The expected return of an asset is then 
positively correlated with its covariance with the market. This means that an asset can only 
achieve higher expected returns by increasing its systematic risk. 
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Jensen (1968) pulled the CAPM into a performance setting for equities like mutual funds. The 
CAPM tells us what a mutual fund is expected to earn given its systematic risk. So for a 
mutual fund to exhibit performance out of the ordinary, it would have to produce a higher rate 
of return than the theory would predict. This abnormal return is measured by the estimated 
intercept in the model given by equation (1) in the methodology section. The famous alpha is 
then the estimated intercept.  
2.1.2 Fama and French 3-Factor Model 
Even though the CAPM worked well for many years, anomalies continued to shake its 
foundation. One of these was the small firm effect discovered by Banz (1981). He found that 
firms with smaller market capitalization tended to give higher returns than the CAPM would 
predict. Fama and French (1993) constructed a variable based on this pattern called the SMB 
(small minus big). Another characteristic that broke with the CAPM equilibrium was the 
value effect. Stocks with a high book-to-market ratio (value stocks) seemed to earn positive 
abnormal returns, while stocks with a low book-to-market ratio (growth stocks) 
underperformed. This resulted in the variable HML (high minus low). These two factors are 
supposed to mimic an underlying and undiversifiable risk that explains the cross-sectional 
returns that are not accounted for by the CAPM. The reasoning of implementing the 
additional variables is quite similar to the well-known market factor in the CAPM. Higher 
returns must be a product of higher risk. Therefore, when small-cap and value stocks over 
time outperform their counterparts, it must be because of some underlying risk that investors 
cannot simply diversify away.   
No absolute answer is given by Fama and French on what this risk that affects economic 
fundamentals really is. They do however come up with some plausible ideas. One of them is 
that the market price of a typical value firm has recently been declining due to bad news, and 
is close to bankruptcy. These firms have historically come back more often than not, hence 
the abnormal returns. As to risk, firms in financial distress will tend to do very bad in times 
where the market has turned sour. This is therefore a type of stock that performs very poorly 
when the overall investor needs it the most. This give reasons to label them with a higher risk 
premium. An explanation like this is one out of many and it is still no general consensus on 
the risk interpretation. 
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Although the model lacks a strong theoretical foundation, it has performed very well in the 
task of explaining asset returns. The R
2
 of Fama and French’s regressions are near 90%, 
which is much higher than what the CAPM could explain.  
2.1.3 Carhart 4-Factor Model 
The momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) is not captured by the 3-factor model. 
In this paper, they find that an investment strategy of buying past winners and selling past 
losers yields significant abnormal returns. They blame this partially on delayed reactions on 
new information, but emphasizes that further research on investor behavior is needed to give 
an absolute conclusion. The risk perspective behind this factor is perhaps even more 
controversial than the Fama and French factors. A theoretical substance is missing and 
plausible explanations are at best questionable.  
Although there is no easy risk interpretation of this factor, some trends indicate that 
momentum based trading contains extra risk. Looking at Figure 5, we see that PR1YR returns 
for the Norwegian market plummet during the turmoil of the recent financial crisis. This 
factor is simply the returns of going long in previous top performers and short in the previous 
bottom performers. A similar trend can be observed for the U.S. momentum factor obtained 
from the webpage of Kenneth R. French.
1
 Figure 13 in the appendix clearly shows two 
distinctive downturns, one during the Great Depression, the other one during the financial 
crisis of 2008. An investor should demand an extra risk premium for holding assets that 
perform poorly in times of economic distress. If assets that are exposed to the momentum 
factor systematically underperform when the overall economy goes bust, then they should be 
given a risk premium like the 4-factor model does. The problem of explaining why these 
assets potentially are more risky than others remains unsolved. 
Carhart (1997) includes a variable that reflects this anomaly and it is a direct extension of the 
3-factor model. He states in his paper that the attachment of the momentum variable, PR1YR 
(prior one year), extensively improves the explained variation of cross-sectional returns 
relative to the CAPM and the 3-factor model. This eliminated almost all of the pricing error 
patterns in his sample, which indicates that the new variable works with explaining asset 
returns. Again, the estimated intercept of the regression serves as the measure of performance. 
                                                 
1
 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html 
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2.2 Research on Persistence  
This issue has also been a subject of extensive research. Persistence gives rise to a rather 
unsophisticated, but commonly used investment strategy of buying past winners. This might 
explain some of its popularity as a field of interest. Mutual fund managers are still depending 
heavily on historical returns when marketing their funds. Thus it seems like investors, to some 
extent, make their investment decision based on how well a fund has performed in the past. 
So the question many researchers have asked is whether top performers continue their 
success, or is it just a matter of random chance.  
Malikel (1995) takes on the U.S. fund market from 1971 to 1991 and looks at the “hot hand” 
phenomenon, i.e. if funds that perform above average continue to do so. He uses a 
methodology where he sorts portfolios based on their performance relative to the median. 
Funds that achieve a higher (lower) rate of return get labeled as winners (losers). The paper 
concludes that hot hands are present in the 1970s, but the pattern seems to disappear in the 
1980s. This is further confirmed when the author simulates trading strategies based on 
persistence. They yield excess returns in the first decade, but struggles to follow up in the 
subsequent. Persistence is therefore present in the sample, but it is not robust. Similar results 
can be found in a variety of papers that analyze the U.S. mutual fund market. 
A different approach is used in the highly influential paper by Carhart (1997). A more 
detailed description is given in the methodology section, but a short summary is beneficial. 
He sorts mutual funds into 10 portfolios based on lagged one-year returns from the year 1963 
to 1993. These portfolios are held for one year until they are rebalanced. 
The results are somewhat mixed. All the portfolios actually exhibit positive monthly excess 
returns, i.e. after deducting the risk-free rate. However, when the returns are risk-adjusted 
with the 4-factor model, all alphas become negative. This observation gives evidence of 
negative abnormal returns in the mutual fund market. Patterns in the results point towards 
some persistence in the sample. For instance, the excess returns decrease nearly 
monotonically with the portfolio ranking. The alphas have a similar trend, but it is not that 
obvious. The top and bottom portfolios are further subdivided into 3 new portfolios for more 
detailed results. Surprisingly enough, a strategy based on buying the extreme winners and 
selling the extreme losers yields an excess return of 1,01% per month. The portfolio also earns 
an alpha value of 0,53% per month with a t-value of 2,72. The paper offers some evidence of 
performance persistence, but argues that this effect is practically eliminated one year after the 
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portfolio formation period for the previous top performers. The losers however, show 
persistent underperformance up to year 3 after the formation. Even though the outline gives an 
impression of a clear pattern, all mean and abnormal returns are not significantly different 
after one year, which implies that the persistence is brief. 
Norwegian equity mutual funds have recently been studied in a similar fashion by Sørensen 
(2009). The portfolios are again held for one year and the returns are worked through by the 
Fama and French 3-factor model. The patterns are a little different compared to the study by 
Carhart. Excess returns are positive for all portfolios, but they seem to be unaffected by 
portfolio rank. The risk-adjusted alphas actually tend to decrease as the ranking improves, but 
none of them are significantly different from zero. 
2.3 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
This theory has played a central part in modern finance and in the world of asset pricing. A lot 
started with Fama’s Ph.D. thesis (1965) on random walks. In this early work he states some 
major implications towards the work of “chartists” who actively uses previous returns as a 
part of their trading strategy, e.g. technical analysis. If asset prices actually follow a random 
walk, then looking at charts of historical prices adds no real value to an investor. Much of the 
same goes for fundamental analyses. If the analyst do not have any knowledge that has not 
already been incorporated in the price, then a fundamental analysis is also worthless in the 
process of valuing an asset. 
In 1969, Fama published a defining paper on market efficiency. This time he puts the whole 
topic into a framework and introduces three formal levels of efficiency. Each of them is 
defined by the information subset that is available. The weak form of market efficiency is 
tested when the information set purely reflects historical data. This means that a valuation 
process cannot be improved by using previous returns that is considered to be common 
knowledge. The semi-strong form assumes that all new publically available information is 
instantly incorporated into asset prices. Testing is therefore primarily based on how prices 
efficiently adjust to new public information. This can be corporate actions like dividend 
announcements, stock splits or mergers. The strong form implies that the information set 
includes all public and private information. This means that no one can use private 
information in order to trade, and make profits, on a specific asset. 
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The main part of Fama (1969) is the link between former research and the three forms of 
market efficiency. During the last remarks of the paper, he concludes that the market is in fact 
efficient in most ways. The weak and semi-strong form was tested in several ways and they 
remained intact. Trading algorithms based on past returns were back tested, but no economic 
profits were registered. Hence, the weak form was not rejected. Event studies were used to 
test the semi-strong form, and they concluded that approximately all relevant information was 
incorporated in the price at the time of the events. The strong form did not hold as well as the 
other two. This is perhaps not that surprising considering its rather extreme position. It was 
basically two issues that really questioned the reliability of the strong form, that being 
corporate insiders and specialists on major exchanges. The first one is more or less self-
explanatory, while the latter is based on their knowledge of unexecuted orders that can affect 
the prices dramatically. Nevertheless, the theory of efficient markets was considered to hold 
quite well. 
The aftermath of such strong statements is seldom quiet. This was by no means an exception. 
It has in fact been under constant attack from both academics and the finance industry ever 
since its release. However, well-functioning markets are still in general considered to be 
efficient, at least in the semi-strong form. 
How is all this related to persistence in mutual fund returns? In practice, if patterns in returns 
are persistent over time, then these can be used in order to predict future returns. Investors can 
furthermore use this to earn better returns on modeled price fluctuations. If this is indeed the 
case, the weak form of market efficiency will not hold. The forthcoming analysis will focus 
on how past returns of mutual funds affect future returns. This can in practice give 
implications towards how consumers can make their investment decisions concerning mutual 
funds. 
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3 Methodology 
A framework quite similar to the one used by Carhart (1997) is applied in order to look at 
short-term persistence. The funds are first sorted into four portfolios formed on one-year 
lagged returns. These portfolios are then rebalanced every one, six and twelve months based 
on the same criterion. The returns are finally risk-adjusted with the 4-factor model to obtain 
alphas that might reveal persistence in the sample. Contingency tables based on this sorting 
are then constructed to expose any patterns in rank dependency. 
3.1 Factor Models 
All three models are presented, even though the 4-factor model is the only one that is used for 
analytical purposes. The reason is that they are direct extensions of their smaller predecessor. 
The CAPM is naturally the foundation of the other models. Jensen (1968) used the CAPM for 
measuring abnormal performance. Returns that are not explained by the market factor are 
captured by the intercept, i.e. the alpha in equation (1).  
                          (1) 
The only risk factor,      , is the return on the market portfolio less the risk-free rate. The 
dependent variable is asset i’s return less the risk-free rate at time t. Excess return, is the 
common terminology for these variables. Epsilon is the regression’s error term. 
The Fama and French model includes two new variables, SMB and HML, in their model 
given by equation (2). 
                                              (2) 
The construction of these two variables for the Norwegian market follows the methodology 
by Fama and French (1996). Stocks are first sorted into two groups, small (S) and big (B), 
based on their market value relative to the median. They are further sorted by their book-to-
market value. Low (L), medium (M) and high (H) are the three new groups. Bernt Arne 
Ødegaard who delivers the Norwegian factors presents the calculations in his paper from 
2011. 
           (  ⁄  
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In general, the SMB factor is a factor-mimicking portfolio that goes long in small-cap stocks 
and short in large-cap stocks. The HML factor goes long in value stocks and short in growth 
stocks.  
The 4-factor model introduces another variable, PR1YR, that captures the momentum effect. 
The model is presented in equation (3). 
                                                         (3) 
The methodology of Carhart (1997) is applied by Ødegaard when he constructs an equivalent 
factor for the Norwegian market. Stocks are ranked based on past eleven-month returns and 
placed into three portfolios. The returns of an equally weighted portfolio that consists of the 
30% worst performers are then deducted from the returns of the portfolio consisting of the 
30% best performers. This means that the factor represents a self-financing portfolio that goes 
long in past winners and short in past losers. 
3.2 Persistence 
There are multiple ways to look for persistence in asset prices. The method used in this thesis 
is originally developed by Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) and later on adopted by 
Carhart (1997). The basic principle is to sort funds into ranked portfolios based on past 
returns and then follow up with a performance analysis. A sign of persistence is when the top 
(bottom) ranked portfolios show superior (inferior) performance relative to the other 
portfolios. 
First of all, an evaluation period must be chosen. Hendricks et al. (1993) investigate several 
lengths, from one to eight quarters. The strongest results come from a one year period, which 
later becomes the key part in Carhart’s study. Shorter time intervals are more likely to be 
influenced by autocorrelation which is one of the reasons in favor of an evaluation period 
equal to one year. This will also be the choice for this analysis.  
Next in line is the sorting procedure. The different funds will be put into four ranked 
portfolios, based on a twelve-month moving average. A fund must have a minimum of twelve 
months of historical returns to be evaluated. For reasons explained in section 4.2, portfolio 
formation starts in December 1996. At this point in time, the sample consists of data from 21 
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mutual funds with sufficient length. The limited number of funds causes restrictions on how 
many portfolios that can be created. The already mentioned papers used eight and ten main 
portfolios in their analysis, but they also had a much larger data sample from the U.S. market. 
The choice therefore falls on four equally weighted portfolios that hopefully give enough 
detail to look at persistence for this dataset. All of them consist of approximately the same 
number of funds. 
Equally weighted portfolios as opposed to value weighted portfolios are quite common in 
performance analyses. If a value weighted approach had been used, big funds like pension or 
corporate funds could have become so influential that they would almost cancel out the 
effects of smaller and more consumer oriented funds. This analysis wants to look at fund 
performance, regardless of size. The angle then turns to each fund’s ability to create abnormal 
returns. 
After the portfolio formation process is done with, a holding strategy needs to be defined. 
Carhart (1997) and Sørensen (2009) reform their portfolios after one year. The intention 
behind this thesis is to take a closer look at shorter time frames. Three different holding 
strategies are therefore implemented in the following analysis. Each portfolio will be 
rebalanced after one, six and twelve months in order to reveal any short-term persistence. 
3.3 Consistency in Ranking  
Another way to look at persistence is how the rankings evolve over the time period. For 
instance, the top ranked funds in one holding period could keep this ranking in the following 
periods. This would be sign of consistent ranking, which again leads to persistence in returns.  
A useful method of illustrating such a property is to create a contingency table. The table will 
show the historical probability of ending in portfolio j given the initial portfolio i. These 
calculations will lead to a three-dimensional column chart. The horizontal axes will refer to 
the initial and the subsequent ranking (i,j), the vertical axis will show the probability of (j|i). 
3.4 Validity 
In order for ordinary least squares (OLS) to give estimated coefficients with a set of desirable 
properties, a number of assumptions involving the error term must be satisfied according to 
Brooks (2008). Note that all the assumptions are made concerning the unobservable 
disturbance term. Given their theoretical nature, an empirical counterpart must be used to 
analyze these properties. The regression residuals will play this role. 
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i.         
ii.          
    
iii.    (     )    
iv.              
v.         
   
The estimators are said to be BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimators) if assumptions i-iv 
hold. This means that the OLS estimators have the smallest possible variance among linear 
estimators. The estimated parameters are also considered to be estimators of their true value 
and form linear combinations of the dependent variable. Finally, they are unbiased, which 
implies that the average values of the estimators will equal their true theoretical counterparts. 
The last assumption needs to be fulfilled in order to apply standard inference theory, i.e. use 
the standard errors that OLS provides directly.    
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4 Data 
This section will focus on the data material used in the statistical analysis. The return data for 
the mutual funds is provided by Morningstar Norway. All other factors are obtained from 
publically available sources.  
4.1 Selection of Funds 
The dataset contains return data for 66 open-ended mutual funds that are alive today. All 
funds are registered in Norway and invest primarily in Norwegian equity. Index funds have 
been excluded because of their passive investment strategy. The focus in this thesis is on 
funds that have a goal of generating abnormal returns for their investors, not those who 
simply try to track a specific benchmark. 
The issue of survivorship bias is highly relevant in this sample. The author was only able to 
get data from funds that are currently active. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the 
regression results in section 5 have an upward bias. This will be discussed in more detail later. 
4.2 Time Period 
The data plots start in the year 1981 when the sample’s first fund is initiated. Needless to say, 
the portfolio sorting procedure will require a certain amount of funds each year. A minimum 
could be set equal to the number of portfolios, 4, but this may result in very volatile returns. 
Furthermore, it could in turn give extreme observations that are not representable for the 
mutual fund market as a whole. This is a consequence of not having data for dead funds. 
Another argument for starting the time series later is that we want to look at the portfolios as 
representative averages for the prior top and bottom performers. Therefore one should have 
multiple funds in each quartile so that potential outliers have less influence on the final 
results.  
The question is then how many funds each portfolio should carry. There is to my knowledge 
no obvious convention on this matter. The choice fell on an intuitive reasonable limit of 5 
funds. This will in practice mean that the 12 month moving averages will begin in December 
1996. The end of the sample is restricted by the availability of the explanatory variables used 
in the 4-factor model. They are provided up to December 2010. This gives the sample a total 
time series of 169 months, or roughly 14 years. 
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4.3 Returns 
The return data is based on the monthly changes in the fund’s net asset value (NAV). The 
NAV is a fund’s total net assets divided by its outstanding shares and it is net of management 
fees and transaction costs. This is later adjusted for dividend payments on the underlying 
stocks, assuming that all payments are reinvested.  
4.4 Benchmark 
The choice of an appropriate benchmark is essential in the multifactor models presented in the 
previous section. This factor should reflect the fund’s investment universe, thus work as a 
market proxy since the true market portfolio is unobservable. 
Every fund is free to choose its own benchmark index. The majority of the sample is currently 
reporting the Oslo Børs Mutual Fund Index (OSEFX) as their benchmark. The index is 
constructed to comply with the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable 
Securities (UCITS) directives which regulate the Norwegian mutual fund industry’s portfolio 
holdings. Because of this, OSEFX will have a maximum weight of 10% for a single security, 
and securities that exceed 5% of the index value must not combined exceed a total of 40%.
2
 
The second most used benchmark is the Oslo Børs Benchmark Index (OSEBX). OSEFX is 
simply a capped version of OSEBX which does not take into consideration the restrictions 
given by the UCITS directives. The focus in this thesis is on persistence and not individual 
performance. It is therefore used a common market proxy across the sample. The OSEFX will 
be this factor since it best reflects the majority of the sample’s investment universe. The data 
is gathered from the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
4.5 Risk-Free Rate of Return 
The 4-factor model uses the asset’s excess return as the dependent variable, and market excess 
return as one of the risk factors. That is the portfolio return and the market proxy return less a 
risk-free rate. In practice, there is no asset that yields a return completely without risk. A 
proxy is therefore needed. Treasury bills are often used for this purpose, Bodie, Kane, & 
Marcus (2009). The U.S. one-month T-bill is used in Carhart (1997) and Fama and French 
(1993). The Norwegian interest market is quite different than many others. For instance, 
Norwegian T-bills are far less liquid than the ones in bigger economies like the U.S. or 
                                                 
2
http://www.oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet/stockIndexGraph?newt__ticker=OSEFX&newt__menuCtx=1.6.3 
16 
 
Germany. This lack of liquidity can give imprecise observations which might make it 
unsuitable as a proxy for the risk-free rate. An alternative is the Norwegian Interbank Offered 
Rate (NIBOR) which reflects the pricing of loans in the interbank market. This is the 
preferred risk free rate according to Ødegaard (2011).  
Due to these reasons, the 1-month NIBOR has been selected as a proxy for the risk-free rate 
of return. The data is collected from the Norwegian central bank.
3
   
4.6 Regression Factors 
The market excess return (RMRF) is simply the market portfolio less the risk-free rate. The 
construction of the remaining factors, HML, SMB and PR1YR, is described thoroughly in 
section 3.1. These are obtained from the web page of Bernt Arne Ødegaard who has 
constructed them for the Norwegian market.
4
 The data is only available up to December 2010, 
which will mark the end of the sample period. This is unfortunate because the return data 
stretches all the way through 2011, so one year of fund returns are therefore lost. 
4.7 Survivorship and Incubation Bias 
The sample only consists of mutual funds that are alive today. The funds that have ceased to 
exist during the time span must have done so for a reason. It seems reasonable that mutual 
funds with bad historic returns find it more difficult to attract capital and to stay alive. This 
might give an upward bias in the sample returns.  
There has been a large debate concerning the importance of survivorship bias. Wermers 
(1997) explain how other studies have found survivorship bias to be a small problem. One of 
the key features is that they did not find a significant difference in the returns of surviving 
funds relative to the whole universe of funds. Malikel (1995) points out that exclusion of non-
surviving funds significantly biases the performance results. The Norwegian fund market is 
evaluated in Sørensen (2009). He reports a statistically significant difference of -0,31% per 
month for dead versus alive funds in the time period 1996:01 – 2008:12. This is quite similar 
to the time period used in this thesis, so a certain amount of survivorship bias must be 
expected from the data sample. 
                                                 
3
http://www.norges-bank.no/no/prisstabilitet/rentestatistikk/nibor-effektiv-rente-manedsgjennomsnitt-av-
daglige-data/ 
4
http://finance.bi.no/~bernt/financial_data/ose_asset_pricing_data/index.html 
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The U.S. mutual fund industry has also been accused of using an incubator strategy where 
fund suppliers privately start up several funds closed off to the public. After an evaluation 
period, they pick the best funds to go public. This effect is studied by Evans (2009) who finds 
evidence of higher risk-adjusted returns for funds in incubation than non-incubated funds. 
This could also bias the returns in this sample. However, the Norwegian fund market is 
relatively small and transparent compared to the U.S. market. Very little attention has been 
given to this subject domestically, so it is assumed that a potential effect like this is negligible. 
4.8 Descriptive Statistics 
This part will in general present historical features of the key variables described in the 
previous sections along with the ranked portfolios. 
4.8.1 Overall Returns 
The overall monthly returns are calculated as an arithmetic mean of an equally weighted 
portfolio consisting of all the funds in the sample stretching from January 1997 to December 
2010. The start date is the first month a portfolio is constructed based on the 12-month 
moving average described in section 4.2. 
 
Table 1: Fund and benchmark statistics  
 
All statistics in percentages are presented in monthly returns. The moments are based on monthly gross returns in the time period 1997:01 – 
2010:12. 
 
As we can see from Table 1, the funds have a higher average return and a lower standard 
deviation than the benchmark index. So in terms of gross returns, the fund sample seems to 
have performed slightly better than the fund index. 
4.8.2 Ranked Portfolios 
A detailed walkthrough of Table 2 would simply be of little value to the remaining text and is 
therefore skipped. However, a few points are still worth mentioning. One can observe from 
Portfolio Mean Std Dev Max Min Skewness Kurtosis
All funds (EW) 1,04 % 6,98 % 15,58 % -25,52 % -0,87 1,64
OSEFX 1,00 % 7,30 % 16,52 % -27,17 % -1,11 2,62
18 
 
the third moment that all ranked portfolios are slightly skewed to left, which can be due to 
relatively low minimum values compared to the maximum values. The monthly means are 
still positive and circles around 1%. This is not the case for the spread portfolios. An 
interesting observation concerning the spreads is that they are all positive, but they decline 
substantially when the holding period increase. The means start off rather impressing with the 
one-month strategy, but become dangerously close to zero when the holding period is set to 
twelve months. All of the main distributions are presented in the appendix for further detail.  
 
Table 2: Ranked portfolio statistics 
 
All statistics in percentages are presented in monthly returns. The moments are based on monthly gross returns in the time period 1997:01 – 
2010:12. The table is divided into three parts, one for each holding strategy. 
 
These properties are better shown in the figures below where cumulative returns on all the 
portfolios are plotted against the sample time series. The spreads are clearly getting thinner as 
the post-formation period increases, and it seems like returns are closing in on the fund index.  
Portfolio Mean Std Dev Max Min Skewness Kurtosis
one-month:
1 (high) 1,26 % 7,31 % 23,27 % -26,14 % -0,63 1,60
2 1,07 % 6,97 % 15,34 % -25,28 % -0,92 1,67
3 0,98 % 7,02 % 15,50 % -25,16 % -0,86 1,52
4 (low) 0,81 % 7,01 % 16,36 % -25,51 % -0,89 1,75
1-4 spread 0,45 % 2,16 % 13,59 % -5,01 % 2,06 10,26
six-month:
1 (high) 1,11 % 7,23 % 16,23 % -26,08 % -0,79 1,35
2 1,08 % 7,01 % 15,65 % -25,42 % -0,91 1,58
3 0,99 % 7,06 % 16,67 % -25,09 % -0,90 1,76
4 (low) 0,94 % 7,00 % 20,85 % -25,51 % -0,72 1,73
1-4 spread 0,16 % 2,13 % 13,23 % -6,50 % 1,36 9,68
twelve-month:
1 (high) 1,05 % 7,22 % 16,23 % -25,59 % -0,77 1,32
2 1,00 % 7,06 % 15,65 % -24,84 % -0,96 1,75
3 1,03 % 7,12 % 16,67 % -26,54 % -0,88 1,79
4 (low) 1,02 % 6,90 % 19,28 % -25,01 % -0,73 1,55
1-4 spread 0,03 % 2,07 % 13,23 % -5,56 % 1,86 11,32
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Figure 2: Cumulative gross returns on ranked portfolios with a one-month holding 
strategy 
 
 
Figure 3: Cumulative gross returns on ranked portfolios with a six-month holding 
strategy 
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Figure 4: Cumulative gross returns on ranked portfolios with a twelve-month holding 
strategy 
 
4.8.3 Regression Factors 
The past movements of the factors could give indications about their importance in the final 
4-factor model. Sørensen (2009) argues that the movement from the CAPM to the F&F 3-
factor model generates major improvements in the explanation of the cross-sectional 
variation, the momentum factor (PR1YR) should however be dropped in the analysis. It yields 
a relatively high return, but it is statistically insignificant in his regressions. This thesis is 
based on a different sample of fund returns and has a shorter time frame, so a separate 
evaluation of the fourth factor is needed. 
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Figure 5: Cumulative gross returns on regression factors 
 
We can see the portfolio that represents a momentum strategy (PR1YR) has the highest 
cumulative return in most years. The difference relative to the other factors also seems to 
increase dramatically during the last four years of the sample. Perhaps the most upsetting 
feature of the graph is the low returns on the HML factor. This is quite different from what is 
presented in Sørensen (2009) where the time period starts in 1982. The SMB yields a fairly 
stable and positive cumulative return. 
 
Table 3: Statistics on regression factors 
 
All numbers are based on monthly returns in the time period 1997:01 – 2010:12. 
 
Every portfolio, except HML, exhibit positive average returns. The PR1YR statistics confirm 
what is observed in Figure 5. It has the highest mean and a rather small standard deviation. 
This implies that a trading strategy based on the construction of PR1YR could have been 
Cross-correlation
Factor portfolio Mean Std Dev Max Min RMRF SMB HML PR1YR
RMRF 0,61 % 7,35 % 16,35 % -27,73 % 1,00
SMB 0,41 % 4,93 % 29,82 % -16,74 % -0,46 1,00
HML -0,10 % 5,63 % 11,62 % -37,75 % -0,19 -0,37 1,00
PR1YR 0,74 % 5,07 % 15,43 % -16,75 % -0,25 0,20 0,02 1,00
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successful during the time span in terms of gross returns. The fact that it is so influential gives 
reason to use the 4-factor model instead of the 3-factor model. This factor will later show 
significant results in the regression analysis as well. 
As one can see from the cross-correlation table, multicollinearity looks to be of no serious 
concern. Interestingly enough, market excess returns (RMRF) are negatively correlated with 
all the other factors. The CAPM alone will therefore miss out on quite a bit of variation.  
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5 Results 
Three different trading strategies have been run in order to look at persistence in the sample. 
Linear regression validity marks the starting point of this section, while aggregated numbers 
from all of the funds are next in line. The results from the sorted portfolios will then be 
introduced in ascending order, based on the strategy’s holding period. All tables will report 
results from the CAPM and the 4-factor model. The latter model is preferred in the risk-
adjustment process, while the CAPM is included for comparative reasons only. Contingency 
tables are presented at the end to see how rankings have evolved throughout the sample 
period.  
5.1 Diagnostic Tests 
As mentioned in the methodology section, all five assumptions, i-v, must hold in order to get 
valid inferences in the regressions. However, the normality assumption does not need to be 
satisfied for OLS to give best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE). Each of the assumptions 
will further be explained and evaluated up against the applied data sample. 
i. The assumption of an expected value of the error term equal to zero will actually never 
be violated as long as an intercept term is included in the regression. As long as the 
underlying theory does not demand a regression through the origin, this assumption is 
of no concern. The main model used in this analysis is the 4-factor model which 
includes an intercept, thus the assumption holds. 
ii. Homoscedasticity implies that the variance of the errors is constant. If the assumption 
does not hold, we say that the errors are heteroscedastic. This gives rise to some 
practical implications. First, the quality of the model predictions will systematically 
depend upon the values of the explanatory variables. Second, the OLS estimators are 
no longer BLUE. The method used to detect potential heteroscedasticity for this 
sample is the White test with squared values. It is conducted by running an auxiliary 
regression with the squared residuals as the dependent variable on the ordinary 
explanatory variables and their squared values as well. One can in addition use cross 
products of the right hand side variables, but this reduces the degrees of freedom 
substantially in this case. The cross products are therefore left out in the regression. A 
standard F-test is then used on the estimators to test the joint hypothesis of no 
dependency. The results presented in Table 4 indicate a relatively strong presence of 
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heteroscedasticity in all regressions except one. This makes the following t-statistics 
questionable, so tables with robust standard errors are presented in the appendix. 
These follow the method of Newey and West (1987) that corrects for 
heteroscedasticity. 
iii. Number three implies that the errors should not be serially correlated, i.e. uncorrelated 
with each other at different points in time. A violation of this assumption will as 
mentioned earlier lead to OLS not giving estimates that are BLUE. In order to identify 
any serial correlation, a portmanteau test is applied. This is equivalent to the Ljung-
Box test that checks whether or not the autocorrelation coefficients are jointly equal to 
zero. The test results say that all three top portfolio regressions show signs of serial 
correlation. The Newey and West (1987) procedure will also give standard errors that 
are corrected for serial correlation. 
iv. This assumption states that the errors must be unrelated to the explanatory variables. 
An alternative formulation is that the variables must be non-stochastic and they need 
to be exogenous. An assumption like this is harder to test explicitly, so a formal 
procedure will not be undertaken to investigate it. In practice, the 4-factor model with 
its underlying theory is trusted in the context of satisfying these properties. 
v. The last one demands that the errors are normally distributed. This means that the 
errors should have a mean equal to zero and a constant variance, which are already 
assumed. They also need to be symmetric about its mean, i.e. a skewness of zero. The 
assumption also implies that the kurtosis should equal to 3. If we take a look at the 
descriptive statistics of the regressions, we can see that every ranked portfolio has a 
negative skewness and a kurtosis well below the required level. A Doornik-Hansen 
normality test is applied to formally investigate this matter. From the test statistics 
below, we can see that most regressions reject the null hypothesis of normality. This 
gives reason to question the validity of the standard t-tests that will be conducted later 
in the results section. There is unfortunately no obvious procedure to account for this 
weakness in the model. However, one can take comfort in the central limit theorem 
that implies that the test statistics will asymptotically have the desired distribution for 
large samples. It is therefore assumed that this sample is large enough, so that the 
inferences can be trusted. 
From the diagnostics presented above, some actions have been made to ensure the validity of 
the regressions. Tables in the appendix are therefore presented with underlying standard errors 
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that are corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation when it is required. The main 
difference between the tables of ordinary standard errors and corrected standard errors is that 
the t-statistics unsurprisingly show lower absolute values in the latter case. This goes 
primarily for the explanatory variables, while the intercept occasionally becomes more 
significant. The consequences of this will not in any way affect the conclusions being made, 
and that is why the tables with corrected values are presented in the appendix. 
 
Table 4: Test statistics for model validity 
 
Tests for heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and normality are conducted for each holding period. The numbers are p-values where the 
asterisks imply:  
*significant at the 5% level 
**significant at the 1% level 
 
Portfolio
H0: No 
heteroskedastici ty
H0: No seria l  
correlation
H0: Normal ly 
dis tributed 
res iduals
one-month:
1 (high) [0.0000]** [0.0031]** [0.0000]**
2 [0.0540] [0.8795] [0.0000]**
3 [0.0000]** [0.2392] [0.0003]**
4 (low) [0.0001]** [0.2631] [0.1907] 
six-month:
1 (high) [0.0000]** [0.0112]* [0.0000]**
2 [0.0003]** [0.9237] [0.0710]
3 [0.0195]* [0.4160] [0.6038]
4 (low) [0.0000]** [0.3135] [0.0000]**
twelve-month:
1 (high) [0.0000]** [0.0120]* [0.0000]**
2 [0.0004]** [0.7502] [0.0277]*
3 [0.0000]** [0.5681] [0.0065]**
4 (low) [0.0000]** [0.4494] [0.0000]**
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5.2 All Funds 
An equally weighted portfolio is created of all the funds in the sample. The statistics here are 
not relevant to the main task, but it serves as a useful summary that can be compared to the 
final results. Table 5 shows that the mutual funds create a positive excess return of 0,66% per 
month over the sample period. This is equivalent to an annualized excess return of 8,15%. 
The market benchmark yields a 7,62% annualized excess return when the risk-free rate is 
deducted. It can further be observed that the sample of funds has created higher and less 
volatile returns compared to the OSEFX. 
The risk-adjusted excess return is highly insignificant. This goes for both the CAPM and the 
Carhart 4-factor model. The funds are therefore unable to create abnormal risk-adjusted 
returns as a unit. The factor loadings reveal a market beta close to one, and positive 
significant exposure towards small-cap stocks. A somewhat surprising result is the negligible 
increase in the adjusted R
2
 when including the additional three factors. In the 4-factor model’s 
defense, increasing the explained cross-sectional variation from 97% is not an easy task. 
 
Table 5: EW portfolio of all funds 
 
All numbers are based on monthly returns in the time period 1997:01 – 2010:12. The mutual funds are sorted into an equally weighted 
portfolio, where the monthly excess returns are regressed against the CAPM and the 4-factor model. The t-statistics are in parenthesis below 
their respective coefficients. The null hypothesis for the RMRF factors is: β=1. 
 
5.3 One-Month Holding Strategy 
The funds are now sorted into four equally weighted portfolios based on their lagged one-year 
returns. The top 25% funds form portfolio 1, while the bottom 25% form portfolio 4. Table 6 
shows increasing excess returns with ranking. The previous top funds seem to outperform the 
others based on simple returns. The top ranked portfolio yields a steady 11,02% annualized 
excess return, which is substantially more than the sample average in Table 5.  
CAPM 4-factor model
Excess 
return Std Dev Alpha RMRF Adj R2 Alpha RMRF SMB HML PR1YR Adj R2
All funds EW 0,66 % 7,04 % 0,08 % 0,94 0,97 -0,01 % 0,98 0,10 0,00 0,02 0,97
(0,81) (-4,45) (-0,08) (-1,44) (4,48) (-0,26) (1,38)
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The risk-adjusted alphas give a similar picture of increasing returns with ranking. The results 
are however insignificant for all portfolios, even at the 10% level. This means that none of the 
portfolios have been able to earn significant abnormal returns in the sample period.  
As to model specification, both of them show very high explanatory power with adjusted R-
squares above 0,9 for all portfolios. The 4-factor model is unable to extensively increase the 
explained variation compared to the CAPM, but it shows significant exposure to the SMB and 
the PR1YR factor in several cases. Only the top ranked portfolio has significant exposure to 
the HML factor, but this is only at the 10% level. The market betas are equal to one, except 
for portfolio 2 that has a beta slightly below one. An interesting observation is the increasing 
exposure, based on ranking, towards the one-year momentum effect. Better ranked portfolios 
seem to have higher factor loadings on the PR1YR factor.  This is also the case in Carhart 
(1997) and Wermers (1997) in their study of the U.S. market. A discussion on this topic is 
outside the scope of this thesis, but it shows possible patterns in the styles of the grouped 
equity funds. 
A theoretical self-financing portfolio that goes long in the previous top performers and short 
in the previous bottom performers is constructed to look at the possible return of such a 
strategy. Monthly excess returns are on average 0,45%, while the alpha is 0,28% per month 
and significant at the 10% level. Such a strategy is practically impossible to implement in the 
Norwegian market, but it gives indications of rank dependency on ex post returns. Although 
the risk-adjusted abnormal return is not significant at the conventional 5% level, it still 
questions the efficiency of the fund market.  
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Table 6: Portfolios ranked on lagged one-year returns and reformed every month 
 
All numbers are based on monthly returns in the time period 1997:01 – 2010:12. The mutual funds are sorted into equally weighted 
portfolios based on their past twelve-month return. Funds with the highest past returns are put into portfolio 1, while portfolio 4 consists of 
funds with the lowest returns. Monthly excess returns are regressed against the CAPM and the 4-factor model. RMRF is the excess return on 
the market proxy. SMB and HML are factor-mimicking portfolios for the size and value effect. PR1YR is a factor-mimicking portfolio for 
the one-year momentum effect. The t-statistics are in parenthesis below their respective coefficients. All portfolios, except the 1-4 spread 
portfolio, have the null hypothesis of a RMRF coefficient equal to one, β1=1.  
 
Figure 6 show the patterns described earlier. One can clearly see that both excess returns and 
risk-adjusted alphas decline with portfolio ranking. The columns should have been equal from 
a market efficiency point of view. The trend on these two indicators shows something quite 
different. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that no alpha is significantly different from 
zero. 
 
CAPM 4-factor model
Portfolio
Excess 
return Std Dev Alpha RMRF Adj R2 Alpha RMRF SMB HML PR1YR Adj R2
1 (high) 0,88 % 7,36 % 0,29 % 0,95 0,91 0,10 % 1,01 0,14 -0,06 0,13 0,93
(1,68) (-1,94) (0,62) (0,45) (3,50) (-1,75) (4,04)
2 0,68 % 7,03 % 0,10 % 0,94 0,97 0,04 % 0,97 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,97
(1,12) (-4,64) (0,43) (-2,19) (2,63) (-0,06) (1,64)
3 0,60 % 7,07 % 0,02 % 0,95 0,98 -0,05 % 0,98 0,09 0,01 0,01 0,98
(0,19) (-4,25) (-0,62) (-1,20) (4,24) (0,73) (0,88)
4 (low) 0,43 % 7,07 % -0,15 % 0,94 0,95 -0,18 % 0,98 0,15 0,03 -0,06 0,96
(-1,18) (-3,76) (-1,54) (-1,24) (4,82) (1,14) (-2,70)
1-4 spread 0,45 % 2,16 % 0,44 % 0,02 0,00 0,28 % 0,04 -0,01 -0,08 0,19 0,22
(2,61) (0,81) (1,84) (1,44) (-0,18) (-2,69) (6,26)
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Figure 6: Monthly excess return and alpha for portfolios ranked on lagged one-year 
returns and rebalanced every month 
 
5.4 Six-Month Holding Strategy 
The portfolio sorting procedure is the same as before, the only difference is the holding period 
which is now set to six months. Excess returns are positive and increasing with portfolio 
ranking. The pattern is basically the same as in the one-month holding strategy, but the 
declining trend is less steep. Annualized numbers are still quite high, as the top ranked 
portfolio yields a 9,01% excess return. 
When it comes to risk-adjusted alphas, the picture is a little different. The top ranked portfolio 
has a smaller alpha than the two next portfolios, as well as being negative. The subsequent 
portfolios show a declining pattern, but all alphas are still insignificant. Hence, no portfolios 
are able to earn significant abnormal returns with the longer six-month holding strategy.  
The explanation of cross-sectional returns is again roughly the same for the two models. 
Market betas are all approximately equal to one, while none of the portfolios show significant 
exposure to the HML factor. The size factor shows something rather different. All coefficients 
are positive and significant at the 5% level. The two top portfolios also show significant 
exposure to the PR1YR factor and it seem to increase with portfolio ranking, as it did under 
the one-month holding period. 
-0,40%
-0,20%
0,00%
0,20%
0,40%
0,60%
0,80%
1,00%
1 (high) 2 3 4 (low)
Excess return
Alpha
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The self-financing portfolio is less noticeable than before. It still produces a positive average 
excess return, but the alpha is highly insignificant with a t-value of only 0,06. So in general, 
this holding strategy has produced inferior results compared to the one-month holding 
strategy. 
 
Table 7: Portfolios ranked on lagged one-year returns and reformed every six months 
 
All numbers are based on monthly returns in the time period 1997:01 – 2010:12. The mutual funds are sorted into equally weighted 
portfolios based on their past twelve-month return. Funds with the highest past returns are put into portfolio 1, while portfolio 4 consists of 
funds with the lowest returns. Monthly excess returns are regressed against the CAPM and the 4-factor model. RMRF is the excess return on 
the market proxy. SMB and HML are factor-mimicking portfolios for the size and value effect. PR1YR is a factor-mimicking portfolio for 
the one-year momentum effect. The t-statistics are in parenthesis below their respective coefficients. All portfolios, except the 1-4 spread 
portfolio, have the null hypothesis of a RMRF coefficient equal to one, β1=1.  
 
The columns in Figure 7 show steadier returns than the previous one. Excess returns are 
increasing with portfolio ranking, but at a lower rate than before. This is the main reason why 
the spread portfolio has performed much worse with this strategy. Also the alphas are closer 
to zero for the top and bottom portfolio. 
 
CAPM 4-factor model
Portfolio
Excess 
return Std Dev Alpha RMRF Adj R2 Alpha RMRF SMB HML PR1YR Adj R2
1 (high) 0,72 % 7,28 % 0,14 % 0,95 0,92 -0,05 % 1,01 0,16 -0,02 0,11 0,93
(0,85) (-2,32) (-0,37) (0,59) (4,21) (-0,80) (3,81)
2 0,69 % 7,07 % 0,11 % 0,95 0,97 0,04 % 0,97 0,07 -0,01 0,03 0,98
(1,26) (-4,24) (0,51) (-1,82) (2,92) (-0,52) (1,91)
3 0,60 % 7,12 % 0,01 % 0,96 0,98 -0,02 % 0,98 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,98
(0,16) (-3,75) (-0,29) (-1,57) (3,15) (0,12) (-0,25)
4 (low) 0,56 % 7,06 % -0,01 % 0,93 0,94 -0,06 % 0,97 0,14 0,01 -0,04 0,95
(-0,11) (-3,78) (-0,50) (-1,42) (4,11) (0,40) (-1,51)
1-4 spread 0,16 % 2,13 % 0,15 % 0,02 0,00 0,01 % 0,05 0,02 -0,04 0,15 0,13
(0,93) (0,76) (0,06) (1,72) (0,58) (-1,07) (4,82)
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Figure 7: Monthly excess return and alpha for portfolios ranked on lagged one-year 
returns and rebalanced every six months 
 
5.5 Twelve-Month Holding Strategy 
This holding period is the same as the one used in Carhart (1997) and Sørensen (2009). The 
patterns that emerged in the two previous strategies are now basically gone. Excess returns are 
still positive but no obvious trend can be spotted. The highest simple return belongs to the top 
ranked portfolio once again, and it yields an 8,26% annualized return.  
Risk-adjusted alphas actually show an opposite trend compared to the one-month holding 
strategy. The alphas decrease with portfolio ranking, so the top ranked portfolio exhibit the 
lowest risk-adjusted return. All of them have t-values well below the conventional limits. 
The 4-factor model is also in this setting unable to improve the high adjusted R
2
 substantially 
from the CAPM. The market beta is significantly below one only for the bottom portfolio. 
HML and SMB coefficients show similar behavior as before. Exposure to the PR1YR factor 
has changed some from the former strategies. It is no longer increasing with portfolio rank 
and only the top portfolio has a significant coefficient at the 5% level. 
Results concerning the self-financing portfolio are not very surprising. The spread between 
portfolio one and four is at its lowest compared to the other strategies. A mere 0,03% monthly 
excess return is produced and the alpha is highly insignificant. 
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Table 8: Portfolios ranked on lagged one-year returns and reformed every twelve 
months 
 
All numbers are based on monthly returns in the time period 1997:01 – 2010:12. The mutual funds are sorted into equally weighted 
portfolios based on their past twelve-month return. Funds with the highest past returns are put into portfolio 1, while portfolio 4 consists of 
funds with the lowest returns. Monthly excess returns are regressed against the CAPM and the 4-factor model. RMRF is the excess return on 
the market proxy. SMB and HML are factor-mimicking portfolios for the size and value effect. PR1YR is a factor-mimicking portfolio for 
the one-year momentum effect. The t-statistics are in parenthesis below their respective coefficients. All portfolios, except the 1-4 spread 
portfolio, have the null hypothesis of a RMRF coefficient equal to one, β1=1. 
 
The distribution of excess returns appears somewhat arbitrary in this setting. Every one of 
them show rather similar excess returns and the ranking do not seem to affect the results. The 
reversed trend compared to the one-month alphas can be observed in Figure 8.  
 
CAPM 4-factor model
Portfolio
Excess 
return Std Dev Alpha RMRF Adj R2 Alpha RMRF SMB HML PR1YR Adj R2
1 (high) 0,66 % 7,28 % 0,08 % 0,95 0,92 -0,11 % 1,02 0,18 -0,01 0,10 0,93
(0,50) (-2,34) (-0,75) (0,77) (4,64) (-0,37) (3,34)
2 0,62 % 7,11 % 0,03 % 0,95 0,97 -0,03 % 0,99 0,09 0,02 0,00 0,97
(0,32) (-3,62) (-0,32) (-0,90) (3,85) (0,97) (0,26)
3 0,65 % 7,17 % 0,05 % 0,96 0,97 0,00 % 0,98 0,06 -0,02 0,02 0,98
(0,62) (-3,06) (-0,01) (-1,23) (2,61) (-1,28) (1,37)
4 (low) 0,63 % 6,95 % 0,06 % 0,92 0,95 0,02 % 0,95 0,10 0,00 -0,02 0,96
(0,55) (-4,79) (0,19) (-2,52) (3,31) (0,02) (-0,94)
1-4 spread 0,03 % 2,07 % 0,02 % 0,02 0,00 -0,13 % 0,07 0,08 -0,01 0,12 0,11
(0,10) (1,14) (-0,86) (2,63) (1,95) (-0,36) (3,91)
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Figure 8: Monthly excess return and alpha for portfolios ranked on lagged one-year 
returns and rebalanced every twelve months 
 
5.6 Trend Summary 
Figure 9 is basically a mirror image of the previous three charts. The lines at the top represent 
excess returns while the corresponding bottom ones are the risk-adjusted returns. The first 
thing that comes to mind is the declining spread of excess returns between the top and bottom 
portfolio as the holding period increases. This may be observed from the slopes in the chart 
below. Excess returns for the one-month holding period has a steep negative slope compared 
to the six-month line. This trend disappears somewhere between six and twelve months as the 
remaining line show no sign of dependent behavior towards the portfolios. If it is looked past 
the fact that alphas are not significantly different from zero, they do show some interesting 
features. The slope of the one-month line is again negative and steeper than the other two. The 
real surprise is the twelve-month line that shows a steady increase as the portfolio ranking 
gets worse. This could of course be a result of mere chance due to the insignificant alpha 
values.  
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Figure 9: Summary of monthly excess return and alpha for portfolios ranked on lagged 
one-year returns 
 
5.7 Consistency in Ranking 
Contingency tables are constructed for each of the holding strategies throughout the sample 
period. The three forthcoming figures illustrate these tables. The columns reflect the historical 
probability of being in portfolio j in one period, given the initial portfolio ranking i. 
Four dominating columns can be seen in the one-month holding strategy. The pairs (1,1), 
(2,2), (3,3) and (4,4) all have probabilities above 60%. In general, the event of a portfolio 
getting the same ranking two months in a row is quite likely. The table also indicates that if a 
portfolio is top ranked in one period, it is an 81% chance of it maintaining this ranking the 
next period. If a portfolio is bottom ranked in one period, it is a 79% chance of it keeping this 
ranking the next period. Needless to say, the other probabilities are fairly low.  
One-month holding strategy   {
            [   ]     
            [   ]     
 
A six-month holding strategy gives a more even distribution. The highest columns are the 
same as before, but they are much less influential. The probabilities are almost monotonically 
changing where the initial ranking is either 1 or 4. The distributions for the other two initial 
rankings seem more arbitrary. The probabilities of persistent over or under performers are 
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much lower with this longer holding period, they are however above 50% which is still 
relatively high.  
Six-month holding strategy   {
            [   ]     
            [   ]     
 
Turning to the more conventional twelve-month holding period, the distribution has evened 
out substantially and no pattern really points out. The highest column is again at the (1,1) 
path, but it is coming close to 25% which would have indicated no persistence in ranking. 
This is immediately the case for (4,4) column. 
Twelve-month holding strategy   {
            [   ]     
            [   ]     
 
 
 
Figure 10: Contingency table of the one-month holding strategy 
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Figure 11: Contingency table of the six-month holding strategy  
 
 
Figure 12: Contingency table of the twelve-month holding strategy 
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6 Conclusion 
Two methods have been used to analyze the short-term persistence in the sample consisting of 
Norwegian equity mutual funds. The first one ranks portfolios based on past returns, which 
are later regressed against the 4-factor model. The second method is more graphical. Rank 
consistency is presented in a column chart with historical probabilities on the vertical axis. 
Both of these methods are applied for three different holding periods; one, six and twelve 
months. 
The sample of funds has outperformed the mutual fund benchmark in terms of gross returns. 
The difference is no more than 40 basis points per month, so the potential survivorship bias 
could be a considerable source to this spread. This equally weighted portfolio of all funds in 
the sample show a positive annualized excess return of 8,15% over the sample period. In 
addition, the fund returns have been less volatile than the OSEFX. Hence, the funds have 
performed slightly better than the market benchmark on these two basic indicators. 
Different holding strategies have certainly created mixed results. The ranked portfolio excess 
returns seem to be more arbitrary distributed when the holding period increases. For the one-
month rebalancing procedure, a clear trend is observed. It tells us that funds with high past 
returns have higher excess returns the next month relative to the others. A similar structure 
holds when the portfolios are rebalanced every six months, but the impact from the ranking is 
less obvious. This trend disappears completely when the portfolios are rebalanced every 
twelve months, as it creates more or less even excess returns across the ranked portfolios. The 
self-financing portfolio that goes long in past winners and short in past losers reflects this 
matter with a declining average return when the holding period increases. It is very close to 
zero for the twelve month strategy, while it produces handsome returns for the one- and six-
month holding strategies. This implies that when it comes to simple returns, some persistence 
is observed for shorter time intervals but not for the longer twelve month period. 
Different results appear when it comes to risk-adjusted alphas. The famous trend applied for 
excess returns is still present for the one-month holding strategy. Alphas increase as ranking 
and past returns increase. This is however not the case for the six-month holding strategy, and 
it completely reverses for the twelve-month holding strategy. It is difficult to make any 
conclusions based on this because of insignificant alphas for all three procedures. The only 4-
factor alpha that sticks out is the spread portfolio when rebalancing every month. It is only 
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significant at the 10% level, but it still creates a signal towards stronger persistence in mutual 
fund performance for shorter post-formation periods. 
Consistency in ranking is illustrated by the charts in section 5.7. Again, large variations 
between the holding periods can be observed. The evolution of persistent over and under 
performers is presented as separate probabilities. These are very high for the one-month 
strategy while they decline substantially when the holding period increases to six months. 
They are still considered to be at a high level, even though they dropped from approximately 
80% to 50% when the holding period changed. These are strong indications of short-term 
persistence in the sample returns. The story changes once again when the twelve-month 
holding period is evaluated. Both probabilities close in on the important 25% limit which 
implies that previous ranking has little to do with future ranking. 
More frequent rebalancing clearly changes the overall appearance of the contingency tables. 
The probability of achieving the same ranking two months in a row is surprisingly high when 
the portfolios are rebalanced every month. All the paired columns show probabilities over 
60% which evidently is a sign of persistent rankings for short periods of time. These columns 
are also the highest ones when the portfolios are rebalanced every six months, they are 
however less dominant this time. Another important pattern in this chart is the change in 
probabilities when the initial ranking is either best or worst. The columns are increasing at an 
almost constant rate when stepping towards the initial ranking. So it seems fair to conclude 
that the sample still shows persistent behavior after six months. Next in line are the portfolios 
that are rebalanced once a year. This chart looks nothing like the other two. All probabilities 
are now reasonably close to 25%. This indicates that the persistent ranking shown for the 
previous two cases fades when the holding period increases to twelve months. 
Market efficiency in its weak form cannot be rejected on the basis of these observations. Clear 
patterns in persistent ranking are observed in the contingency tables, but this tells us nothing 
about the size of the returns that hides behind the columns. This makes them unsuitable to 
make any general conclusions towards market efficiency. Risk adjusted returns are more 
practical oriented and serves as a better efficiency indicator. The results are pretty much 
consistent throughout all the three holding strategies. They imply that no investor could have 
earned positive risk-adjusted returns if they had implemented one of the strategies presented.  
All of them are based solely on historic returns, so they are directly aimed towards the weak 
form of efficiency. It is also worth noticing that potential transaction costs and taxes fall 
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outside these models, so the net returns in real life would have been even smaller. It is 
therefore fair to say that the market for Norwegian equity mutual funds seems fairly efficient 
in this context. That being said, there are multiple other ways to check for persistence and 
market efficiency. Sorting windows and holding periods can for instance be combined in an 
almost infinite number of ways, so much research can still be done with the same basic 
approach as the one used in this analysis.  
Short-term persistence has been the main focus in this thesis. A short recap of the findings 
will now serve as a suitable ending to the research. First, funds with high previous returns 
seem to have relatively higher excess returns for one and six months after the evaluation 
period. Second, rankings do not significantly affect the risk-adjusted abnormal returns. Third, 
funds are more likely to achieve the same ranking two periods in a row when the sorted 
portfolios are rebalanced every one and six months. Fourth and last, persistent behavior in 
fund returns is gradually diminishing when the post-formation period increases from one to 
six and twelve months. This goes for simple returns, alphas and rank dependency.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 13: Cumulative returns for the American momentum factor 
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Figure 14: Return distributions for the ranked portfolios based on the one-month 
holding period 
 
 
Figure 15: Return distributions for the ranked portfolios based on the six-month holding 
period 
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Figure 16: Return distributions for the ranked portfolios based on the twelve-month 
holding period 
 
Table 9: Portfolios ranked on lagged one-year returns and reformed every month with 
HAC standard errors 
 
All numbers are based on monthly returns in the time period 1997:01 – 2010:12. The mutual funds are sorted into equally weighted 
portfolios based on their past twelve-month return. Funds with the highest past returns are put into portfolio 1, while portfolio 4 consists of 
funds with the lowest returns. Monthly excess returns are regressed against the 4-factor model. RMRF is the excess return on the market 
proxy. SMB and HML are factor-mimicking portfolios for the size and value effect. PR1YR is a factor-mimicking portfolio for the one-year 
momentum effect. The t-statistics are in parenthesis below their respective coefficients and the underlying standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HACSE). All portfolios have the null hypothesis of a RMRF coefficient equal to one, β1=1. 
4-factor model
Portfolio
Excess 
return Std Dev Alpha RMRF SMB HML PR1YR Adj R2
1 (high) 0,88 % 7,36 % 0,10 % 1,01 0,14 -0,06 0,13 0,93
(0,70) (0,36) (2,56) (-0,95) (2,38)
2 0,68 % 7,03 % 0,04 % 0,97 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,97
(0,43) (-2,19) (2,63) (-0,06) (1,64)
3 0,60 % 7,07 % -0,05 % 0,98 0,09 0,01 0,01 0,98
(-0,69) (-0,72) (2,69) (0,58) (0,72)
4 (low) 0,43 % 7,07 % -0,18 % 0,98 0,15 0,03 -0,06 0,96
(-1,49) (-0,87) (3,18) (0,93) (-2,12)
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Table 10: Portfolios ranked on lagged one-year returns and reformed every six months 
with HAC standard errors 
 
All numbers are based on monthly returns in the time period 1997:01 – 2010:12. The mutual funds are sorted into equally weighted 
portfolios based on their past twelve-month return. Funds with the highest past returns are put into portfolio 1, while portfolio 4 consists of 
funds with the lowest returns. Monthly excess returns are regressed against the 4-factor model. RMRF is the excess return on the market 
proxy. SMB and HML are factor-mimicking portfolios for the size and value effect. PR1YR is a factor-mimicking portfolio for the one-year 
momentum effect. The t-statistics are in parenthesis below their respective coefficients and the underlying standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HACSE). All portfolios have the null hypothesis of a RMRF coefficient equal to one, β1=1. 
 
Table 11: Portfolios ranked on lagged one-year returns and reformed every twelve 
months with HAC standard errors 
 
All numbers are based on monthly returns in the time period 1997:01 – 2010:12. The mutual funds are sorted into equally weighted 
portfolios based on their past twelve-month return. Funds with the highest past returns are put into portfolio 1, while portfolio 4 consists of 
funds with the lowest returns. Monthly excess returns are regressed against the 4-factor model. RMRF is the excess return on the market 
proxy. SMB and HML are factor-mimicking portfolios for the size and value effect. PR1YR is a factor-mimicking portfolio for the one-year 
momentum effect. The t-statistics are in parenthesis below their respective coefficients and the underlying standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HACSE). All portfolios have the null hypothesis of a RMRF coefficient equal to one, β1=1. 
4-factor model
Portfolio
Excess 
return Std Dev Alpha RMRF SMB HML PR1YR Adj R2
1 (high) 0,72 % 7,28 % -0,05 % 1,01 0,16 -0,02 0,11 0,93
(-0,44) (0,50) (2,49) (-0,54) (2,30)
2 0,69 % 7,07 % 0,04 % 0,97 0,07 -0,01 0,03 0,98
(0,56) (-1,45) (3,14) (-0,40) (1,75)
3 0,60 % 7,12 % -0,02 % 0,98 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,98
(-0,27) (-0,99) (1,99) (0,10) (-0,19)
4 (low) 0,56 % 7,06 % -0,06 % 0,97 0,14 0,01 -0,04 0,95
(-0,54) (-1,07) (3,03) (0,23) (-1,29)
4-factor model
Portfolio
Excess 
return Std Dev Alpha RMRF SMB HML PR1YR Adj R2
1 (high) 0,66 % 7,28 % -0,11 % 1,02 0,18 -0,01 0,10 0,93
(-0,90) (0,33) (2,65) (-0,22) (1,76)
2 0,62 % 7,11 % -0,03 % 0,99 0,09 0,02 0,00 0,97
(-0,32) (-0,81) (2,28) (0,79) (0,01)
3 0,65 % 7,17 % 0,00 % 0,98 0,06 -0,02 0,02 0,98
(-0,05) (-1,11) (1,81) (-0,86) (0,95)
4 (low) 0,63 % 6,95 % 0,02 % 0,95 0,10 0,00 -0,02 0,96
(0,21) (-1,84) (2,74) (0,01) (-0,74)
